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The literature provides many examples suggesting that males have, on average, higher 
academic self-concept levels when compared to females, especially in mathematical 
domains. Three meta-analyses were conducted to examine the magnitude of differences in 
overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concept. For all three constructs, males 
scored significantly higher than females on measures of self-concept, with weighted mean 
effect sizes from d = 0.13 to d = 0.41. Additionally, moderator variables such as the 
publication year of the study, were examined in an attempt to identify potential sources of 
gender differences in academic self-concept domains. The results of moderator analyses 






INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
With literature dating back to William James’ 1890 publication, self-concept 
research has been an area of investigation for over a century. However, the 80 years 
following James’ publication were filled with inconsistent forms of measurement and 
disparate definitions of self-concept (Byrne 1996). Shavelson, Hubner, and Stanton’s 
(1976) critical evaluation of the self-concept literature marked a shift in the validation and 
exploration of the construct. The construct has gained much attention in the past 40 years, 
and the model proposed by Shavelson et al. has been greatly clarified since its publication 
(Marsh, 1990b; Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1988; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). Seen as forces 
that guide human behavior, self-views are important when predicting general and specific 
outcomes including depression (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007), goal 
pursuit (Stipek & Gralinski, 1996), and academic performance (Hattie, 1992; Kornilova, 
Kornilov & Chumakova, 2009). Various factors such as gender and personality can 
moderate an individual’s self-concept and related outcomes (Beloff, 1992; Furnham & 
Buchanan, 2005; Furnham, Shahidi, & Baluch, 2002). 
My review will begin with a discussion of the operationalization of self-concept, 
including an examination of operational shortcomings and comparisons between related 
self-constructs. I will then summarize the development of the self-concept literature, with 
a primary focus on academic self-concept; this will include common measures used to 
assess academic self-concept. Finally, my review will address the gender differences in 
academic self-concept, and some of the theories commonly used to explain the gender 
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difference. Based on standards used in current gender difference research, the following 
guidelines will be used to evaluate effect sizes: d = 0.20-0.49 considered a small difference, 
d = 0.50-0.79 considered moderate, and d greater than 0.80 considered large (Cohen, 1988; 
Hyde, 2005). Additionally, d < 0.20 will be considered a trivial sex difference. 
1.1 Differentiation of Self-Concept and Related Constructs 
One of the primary concerns of self-concept research is the lack of a consistently 
used operational definition (Byrne, 1984). Although there have been numerous attempts to 
explicitly define the construct of self-concept, the findings have been inconclusive (e.g., 
Byrne, 1984; Hansford & Hattie, 1982; Shavelson et al., 1976). For example, Shavelson et 
al. (1976) determined 17 different dimensions on which the construct could be organized. 
Also, due to the broad definition of self-concept, researchers have tended to use certain 
terms synonymously and without conceptual clarification (Hattie, 1992). It is important to 
note that, within the same article, self-concept may also be labeled interchangeably as self, 
self-estimation, and/or self-perception (Byrne, 1996).   
Along with using terms synonymously throughout the literature, the self-concept 
literature suffers from imprecise theoretical definitions and inconsistent operationalization. 
Marsh (1990a) explained that “self-concept, like many other psychological constructs, 
suffers in that ‘everybody knows what it is,’ so that many researchers do not feel compelled 
to provide any theoretical definition of what they are measuring” (p. 79). Therefore, it is 
important to explicitly distinguish self-concept from other self-beliefs to ensure that the 
measurement and theoretical model being used are cohesive. Self-esteem and self-efficacy 
are related constructs that are commonly confused with or poorly differentiated from self-
concept. This is, in part, due to the constructs correlating so highly with each other that 
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researchers have questioned whether they are truly different (for a review, see Pajares, 
1996). For example, when examining domain specific self-beliefs, Pajares and Miller 
(1994) found that mathematical self-efficacy and mathematical self-concept were highly 
correlated (r = .61). Additionally, Chen, Gully, and Eden (2004) found that measures of 
general self-efficacy and measures of self-esteem were also highly correlated (r = .59-.74). 
Though the constructs are similar and related, it is essential to recognize their theoretical 
distinctions (Valentine, DuBois, & Cooper, 2004).  
When looking at self-beliefs, it is helpful to consider the related constructs as a 
hierarchical model (see Figure 1). Self-esteem, sometimes referred to as “global self-
concept,” is at the apex of the structure (Marsh & Yeung, 1998; Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, 
& Baumert, 2006), and refers to an individual’s overall feeling of self-worth (Bong & 
Clark, 1999; Hattie, 1992; Rosenberg, 1965). Self-esteem consists of appraisals of the 
descriptive components of self-concept (Valentine et al., 2004) and is high in affective 
evaluation (Byrne, 1996; Marčič & Kobal Grum, 2011). Focus on self-worth can be seen 
in items found on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale such as “I take a positive attitude 
toward myself” and “In general, I am satisfied with myself” (Rosenberg, 1965). 
In contrast, self-efficacy is measured with the greatest level of specificity (Pajares 
& Miller, 1994), and can be described as “people’s judgements of their capabilities to 
organize and execute courses of action required to obtain designated types of 
performances” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391). Self-efficacy is context-dependent and focuses on 
what one expects he/she can achieve in terms of specific tasks in given situations (Bong & 
Skaalvik, 2003; Pajares & Miller, 1994). Measures of self-efficacy are concerned with how 
individuals view their potential to accomplish tasks and ask questions relating to a specific  
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Figure 1. Representation of self-belief constructs as a hierarchical model. The model 
consists of self-esteem positioned at the top, domain-specific self-concept in the middle, 
and situational evaluations of self-efficacy at the base. Created based on “Self-esteem, 
academic self-concept, and achievement: How the learning environment moderates the 
dynamics of self-concept.” by Trautwein, U., Lüdtke, O., Köller, O., & Baumert, J. (2006). 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 334-349. 
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action under certain circumstances (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). For example, self-efficacy 
measures might include items such as “How sure are you that you can write a simple 
sentence with good grammar?” (Pajares, Miller, & Johnson, 1999). 
Self-concept lies somewhere in between the previous constructs in the self-belief 
hierarchy; it is not as global as self-esteem, yet it is not task-specific like self-efficacy. 
Defined most broadly as “a person’s perception of himself,” self-concept tends to be 
domain specific (Shavelson et al., 1976, p. 411). Additionally, compared to self-esteem, 
which is primarily affective, and self-efficacy, which is primarily cognitive, self-concept 
is composed of cognition, affect, and behavior (Byrne, 1996; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). 
Self-concept judgements rely on how competent a person believes he/she is in a certain 
domain (e.g. “I am a good science student”), rather than assessing overall self-worth or 
ability to perform task-specific behaviors (Bong, Skaalvik, 2003; Pajares & Miller, 1994). 
1.2 Development of Self-Concept Theoretical Models 
With little uniformity in the use of an operational definition and the challenging 
differentiation of self-belief constructs, the self-concept literature has a history of being 
indefinite. For the 80 years following James’ (1890) work, the conceptualization of self-
concept was inconsistent, and researchers struggled with comparing results and 
interpreting findings due to varying operational definitions (Shavelson et al. 1976). To 
rectify these issues, Shavelson et al. (1976) attempted to operationally define self-concept 
in hopes of creating a cohesive, overarching theory for researchers to work from. Through 
their investigation of five major instruments, they identified seven components that were 
crucial to defining the construct; these components were that self-concept is: (a) organized, 
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(b) multifaceted, (c) hierarchical, (d) stable, (e) developmental, (f) evaluative, and (g) 
differentiable (Shavelson, et al., 1976). 
Shavelson et al. (1976) suggested that one’s self-concept is formed through 
experience with the environment and feedback from significant others; also, self-concept 
is both cause and effect in that it influences behaviors, which in turn can influence one’s 
self-concept. These authors also proposed that self-concept is a multidimensional and 
hierarchically ordered structure with general self-concept positioned at the zenith and 
evaluations of behaviors in specific situations at the bottom (see Figure 2). In the middle 
of the proposed hierarchical model, self-concept is then divided into two primary facets: 
academic and non-academic. The second-order facets of self-concept are also subdivided 
into four domains within academic self-concept: English, history, math, and science 
(Shavelson, et al., 1976). The non-academic component of the model fell outside the area 
under investigation. Although Shavelson et al. did not initially justify the model with 
empirical evidence, their posited model is one of the most comprehensively validated 
models of self-beliefs and was a milestone in the renaissance of self-concept research 
(Byrne, 1996; Marsh, 2006). 
In hopes of addressing the lack of a sufficient measure of self-concept, Marsh and 
colleagues developed the Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ) instruments (Marsh & 
O’Neill, 1984). Based primarily on the theoretical foundation of Shavelson et al. (1976), 
Marsh and O’Neill (1984) designed the SDQ-III measure to examine self-concept in late 
adolescents using the following domains: mathematics, verbal, academic, problem-solving, 
physical abilities, physical appearance, same-sex peers, opposite-sex peers, relations with 




Figure 2. Hierarchical representation of self-concept with general self-concept positioned 
at the apex and situation-specific evaluations of behaviors at the base. Adapted from “Self-







(Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). Each of the subscales measuring the different domains in the 
SDQ-III consists of 10 or 12 items with 8-point Likert-type response scales (Marsh, 1992). 
While investigation of the SDQ-III provided support for the multidimensionality of self-
concept (domain correlations had a mean r = .08), the hierarchical structure and the 
correlations between domains were weaker than expected with nothing significantly 
correlating with the general self factor (e.g. Marsh, 1990b; Marsh, 2006; Marsh & O’Neill, 
1984; Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1988).  
Though some research supported the Shavelson et al. (1976) model (e.g., Shavelson 
& Bolus, 1982), subsequent research showed that math and verbal self-concept factors do 
not correlate highly enough to be considered a single higher-order academic self-concept 
(Marsh, 1987; Marsh, 2006; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). Despite the overall hierarchy of the 
Shavelson model being weak, Marsh & O’Neill recognized that academic scales could in 
fact be represented on two higher order factors: verbal ability and math ability. 
Interestingly, during the process of validation and reliability testing, although math and 
verbal achievement were highly correlated with each other ( r =.59) and self-concept in 
each domain was highly correlated with achievement in the same domain (math r = .58, 
verbal r = .42), math and verbal self-concept were uncorrelated with each other (r = -.04; 
Marsh & O’Neill, 1984). 
In response to the surprisingly low correlations between math and verbal self-
concepts, Marsh and colleagues proposed two different theoretical advancements. The first 
addition Marsh made to the literature was devising a model related to Shavelson’s, but with 
more specificity in academic self-concept (Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Marsh, Byrne, & 
Shavelson, 1988).  After testing competing models, Marsh and colleagues identified that 
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having two higher-order factors (math and verbal self-concept) fit the data significantly 
better than the original model with only a single, overall higher-order factor (Marsh & 
Hocevar, 1985; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). This new model, known as the 
Marsh/Shavelson revision, was supported by subsequent research by Marsh and his 
colleagues (Marsh, 1987; Marsh, et al., 1988; Marsh, 1990b).  
Second, in regards to the uncorrelated math and verbal self-concept measures, 
Marsh (1986) suggested that people use two different frames of reference when forming 
self-concepts; this theory became known as the internal/external frame of reference model. 
Specifically, people use an external frame of reference where they compare their abilities 
to the abilities of others, and an internal frame of reference where they compare their level 
of ability in one domain to their level of ability in another. Because objective math and 
verbal abilities are substantially correlated with each other (r = .5 to .8), external 
comparisons lead to a positive relationship between math self-concept and verbal self-
concept (Marsh, 1986). Conversely, internal comparisons amplify the intraindividual 
differences between math and verbal abilities, resulting in a negative relationship between 
math self-concept and verbal self-concept. When taken together, these comparisons end up 
negating each other, resulting in a near-zero correlation between math and verbal self-
concept (r = -.03 to .03; Marsh, 1986). 
1.3 Self-Assessed Intelligence and Lay Definitions of Intelligence 
 In addition to self-concept measures, researchers also have used self-assessed 
intelligence (SAI) measures to evaluate self-perceptions of cognitive ability. Although 
some researchers have advocated for the differentiation of self-estimation and academic 
self-concept as constructs (Freund & Kasten, 2012), there is considerable overlap in their 
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conceptualizations (Peterson & Whiteman, 2007). Self-estimates are understood as 
expressions of self-concept, and are vital components of a person’s overall self-view 
(Epstein, 1973; Freund & Kasten, 2012). Additionally, SAI tends to focus on people’s lay 
perceptions of intelligence (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham 2005; Furnham, 2001). 
Compared to explicit theories of intelligence, which refer to those that are based on 
collected cognitive function data, SAI is grounded in implicit theories, which refer to ideas 
that are constructed by individuals (i.e. lay persons) based on their experiences (Freund & 
Kasten, 2012; Sternberg, 1990). Though there has been little empirical evidence supporting 
the theory (Furnham, Hosoe, & Tang, 2002), Gardner’s (1983, 1999) notion of multiple 
intelligences is commonly used to assess SAI due to the assumption that lay people’s 
implicit theories of intelligence are generally multidimensional (Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2005).  
Gardner’s (1983) pluralistic approach to intelligence stemmed from his belief that 
traditional measures of academic achievement were too restrictive and relied too heavily 
on typical academic domains of linguistics and mathematics. He posited that all individuals 
possess a level of intelligence in eight different domains, and one’s intelligence “shape” is 
made up of varying strengths and weaknesses across the different areas (Gardner, 1999). 
Therefore, when obtaining participants’ SAI, it is common for surveys to request rankings 
for each domain, as well as a rating for overall intelligence. Though Gardner (1983) did 
not explicitly operationally define any of the intelligences, based on his provided 
parameters, researchers have defined his verbal domain, linguistic intelligence, as 
“sensitivity to spoken and written language and the ability to learn languages,” and his 
math domain, logical/mathematical intelligence, as “the capacity to analyze problems 
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logically, solve math problems and investigate issues scientifically” (Furnham & 
Fukumoto, 2008, p. 64). Self-estimates are typically measured by having participants rate 
their intelligence based on normal distribution curves with labeled standard deviations and 
means (Furnham & Baguma, 1999; Peterson & Whiteman, 2007). However, it should be 
noted that when self-concept measures are administered in a format similar to self-
estimations, they have generally the same pattern of validity correlations with other self-
estimation measures (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007). 
1.4 Gender Differences in Academic Self-Concept 
 The academic self-concept literature includes examination of many other variables, 
but the most prominent and frequently discussed topic is gender (Hattie, 1992). Though 
there is some disagreement among researchers (Skaalvik, 1997; Stake, 1992), men’s self-
estimates of overall intelligence are commonly higher than women’s (Bennett, 1996; von 
Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009). Some researchers have hypothesized that 
the difference in self-report measures between genders is due to men’s overestimation and 
women’s underestimation of their own intelligence. This is often referred to as ‘male-
hubris – female humility,’ and has been studied across various cultures (Furnham, Hosoe, 
& Li-Ping Tang, 2002; Kaufman, 2012; Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2011). Hogan (1978) 
was one of the first researchers to examine the differences between men’s and women’s 
perceptions of their own and others’ levels of intelligence, and found that, compared to 
men, women consistently underestimated their own intelligence. These findings were 
supported by Beloff (1992), and subsequent research on self-concept has primarily found 
significant gender differences in self-reported overall intelligence (e.g. Furnham & Rawles, 
1995; Marsh, 1994; Workman, 2004).  
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 In addition to overall intelligence, gender differences have been examined in more 
specific domains of self-concept such as verbal and mathematical ability. In general, 
mathematics is stereotyped as a male domain, whereas verbal ability is stereotyped as a 
female domain (Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006; Nosek et al., 
2009). For example, when estimating their children’s scores, parents anticipated higher 
scores for boys compared to girls on mathematical ability, and higher scores for girls 
compared to boys on verbal ability (Furnham & Bunclark, 2006). When gender differences 
are found in verbal and mathematical self-concept, they tend to correspond with traditional 
gender-roles and stereotypes (Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2004). A recent meta-analysis of SAI 
found the largest weighted mean gender differences effect size was for mathematical–
logical self-concept (d = .44), suggesting that men had significantly higher self-estimations 
in the domain than women (Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2011). Additionally, a meta-
analysis of gender differences among children and adolescents suggests a small, but 
significant, gender difference in mathematical self-concept (d = .29; Wilgenbusch & 
Merrell, 1999). Though there have been some conflicting results in the literature (for 
contradictory findings see Furnham and Akande, 2004), recent meta-analyses support the 
notion that men rate themselves significantly higher than women do on mathematical 
abilities. 
 Also, in line with traditional gender roles, self-perception of ability in verbal 
domains appears to be higher for females than for males, when there is a difference 
(Furnham, Rakow, Sarmany-Schuller & DeFruyt, 1999; Nasser & Singhal, 2006).  
Wilgenbusch and Merrell (1999) found a small, yet significant effect size favoring females 
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in their meta-analysis (d = -.23). However, Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2011) found a 
contrasting result of a marginal gender difference favoring men (d = .07).  
1.5 Theories of Gender Differences and Similarities 
 In general, there are two competing views explaining gender differences in self-
concept: theories that suggest an underlying gender difference in actual, psychometrically 
tested ability due to biological differences, and theories that suggest differences due to 
gender stereotypes and magnitude of sex-role orientation (Freund & Kasten, 2011). I will 
discuss the two major competing theoretical categories below. 
 Though not the first to study gender differences in academic self-concept, Beloff 
(1992) was the first to address the trend for women to rate their own intelligence 
significantly lower than men rated theirs. Replicating Hogan’s (1973) findings that women 
tended to underestimate their IQ scores, Beloff (1992) argued that these self-estimates of 
ability were not representative of the sample’s actual cognitive ability and were partially 
due to gender stereotypes. Campion (1992) countered that there was no reason to assume 
that the two groups were of equal intelligence, and therefore, the assumptions made by 
Beloff were unwarranted due to objective intelligence not being measured. Nevertheless, 
in regards to self-estimates of overall intelligence, an underlying gender difference in actual 
cognitive performance due to biological differences does not seem to be a comprehensive 
explanation (Beyer, 1990). Beyer found that when evaluating gender differences in 
performance expectancies, actual performance, and self-evaluations of stereotypically 
gender-typed tasks, expectancies affected self-evaluations above and beyond actual 
performance. This suggests that objective cognitive ability is not the only factor underlying 
the development of an individual’s self-concept (Beyer, 1990).  
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The current consensus in the literature is that there are no differences between men 
and women on measures of overall intelligence (Colom, Juan-Espinosa, Abad, & Garcia, 
2000). However, it is important to identify how overall intelligence is being conceptualized 
when considering gender differences in ability. With differences varying in magnitude for 
various domains, the difference between men and women on a general intelligence measure 
can vary depending of the content of the test (Ackerman, 2006). For example, when 
examining the differences between estimated intelligence and objective intelligence for 
men and women, Reilly and Mulhern (1995) only used the Digit Symbol and Vocabulary 
tests from the WAIS to extrapolate participants’ IQ scores. Though these subscales might 
have been satisfactory measures of objective overall intelligence, the results could have 
been very different if they used a different measure such as the Stanford-Binet IQ test. 
Without an overall consensus of how to define general intelligence, researchers must be 
explicit in their construct definitions when examining gender differences in overall 
intelligence (Ackerman, 2006). 
Though specific domains of intelligence might seem easier to operationalize than 
general academic ability, mathematical intelligence and verbal intelligence findings are 
actually more complicated. For mathematical ability, meta-analyses suggest that gender 
differences in favor of men are trivial in magnitude (Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen, & Linn, 
2010), but can increase in magnitude when looking at complex problem solving (Hyde, 
Fennema, & Lamon, 1990). Conversely, for verbal ability, studies have suggested minimal 
gender differences favoring women (Hyde, 2014; Hyde & Linn, 1988; Wilgenbusch & 
Merrell, 1999). For both objective math and verbal ability, the magnitude of the gender 
differences continues to be a topic of debate. It is possible that part of the discrepancy in 
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results is due to varying levels of specificity or cognitive level in assessments used across 
studies (Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 1990). For overall intelligence and specific domains, 
it is still unclear whether or not gender differences in self-concept reflect actual differences 
in objectively measured intelligences. Although the best way to investigate the extent to 
which gender differences on subjective measures reflect differences on objective measures 
would be a direct comparison with the same samples, there are surprisingly few studies 
addressing the issue (Freund & Kasten, 2011). 
In spite of objective measures of intelligence generally supporting Hyde’s (2005) 
hypothesis that males and females are more alike than they are different, gender differences 
persist in self-concept literature. Where do these gender differences come from? According 
to cognitive social learning theory, both children and adults attempt to emulate others in 
their environment, and learn via reinforcements and punishments (Bussey & Bandura, 
1999). At a very young age, children internalize cultural stereotypes and conform to 
societal expectations of gender, and this adherence to gender norms is further reinforced 
by parents’ differential treatment of their sons and daughters (Eagly & Wood, 2013). Bong 
and Skaalvik (2003) explained that people view themselves the way others perceive them; 
this follows Shavelson et al.’s (1976) idea that self-concept is formed through experiences 
with the environment and significant others. Furthermore, Gentile, Grabe, Dolan-Pascoe, 
Twenge, Wells, and Maitino (2009) suggested that self-evaluations are influenced by a 
“generalized other,” which leads to differential expectations for men and women.  
Another explanation for gender differences in self-concept is Eagly and Wood’s 
(1999; Wood & Eagly, 2012) sociocultural theory. This theory suggests that society’s 
division of labor by gender underlies all other psychological discrepancies (Hyde, 2014). 
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Therefore, gender differences stem from a person’s adaptations to the various limitations 
on or opportunities for their gender. In support of sociocultural theory, Nosek et al. (2009) 
found that nations’ sex differences in science and mathematics achievement were 
significantly correlated with the nations’ implicit gender-science stereotyping. Whether 
through sociocultural or cognitive social learning theory, gender stereotypes and gender 
role expectations exist. Males are more commonly ascribed intellectual competence than 
females (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972), and Furnham 
(2000, 2001) has argued that intelligence is male normative. Specifically, mathematical 
intelligence is viewed as more masculine, and verbal intelligence is seen as more feminine 
(Bennett, 2000).  
Though boys and girls differ in early socialization, there is variation in the degree 
to which individuals develop stereotypically gendered traits (Reilly & Neumann, 2013). 
Bem (1981) posited that self-concept is directly related to people’s gender schema, and 
through learning and schematic processing, self-concept becomes sex-typed over time. She 
suggested that, due to internalized sex-type, people regulate their behavior so that it 
conforms to society’s cultural definitions of ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness.’ This adherence to 
traditional sex-roles shapes both self-concept and behavior, and through this process, 
gender stereotypes become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Bem also suggested that the more 
sex-typed a person is (i.e. how strongly they identify themselves as their gender), the more 
likely they are to adhere to traditional gender roles (Bem, 1981).  
Gender stereotypical traits and behaviors influence academic self-concept in many 
ways. Roberts (1991) suggested that males and females interpret information related to 
failure/success differently. Women tend to take note of both positive and negative 
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commentary, whereas men overlook negative information and retain only positive 
feedback. This difference in reception and recall of feedback potentially inflates male self-
evaluation (Beloff, 1992). Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2013) suggested that, rather than 
gender differences arising due to females tending to be more self-deprecating, the 
discrepancy in self-concepts is due to a self-enhancing effect of masculinity. 
1.6 The Current Study 
 Several factors warrant a new meta-analytic investigation of gender differences in 
academic self-concept. The most recent meta-analysis that focused on self-perceptions of 
academic ability was Syzmanowicz and Furnham’s (2011) study on self-estimates. Though 
this analysis is relatively recent and provided an overview of current research, the article 
was not without limitations. Syzmanowicz and Furnham’s studies yielded what they 
considered moderate effects for general intelligence (d = 0.37), mathematical intelligence 
(d = 0.44), and spatial intelligence (d = 0.43); minimal effects were found for verbal 
intelligence (d = 0.07). All results favored men. However, due to their position that 
academic self-concept and self-assessed intelligence were different constructs, 
Syzmanowicz and Furnham did not utilize any studies of academic self-concept. In 
addition to the analysis being limited to only self-estimates of ability, the article used the 
fixed-effect method which tends to inflate Type I error rates, and relied primarily on an 
abundance of single-variable one way ANOVAs to assess moderators without controlling 
for their multiple comparisons. The Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2011) article provided a 
framework from which to build, but the scope and methods leave room for improvement.  
I will conduct three meta-analyses, examining gender differences in verbal, 
mathematical, and overall academic self-concept. The study will use a collection of articles 
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on both academic self-concept and self-estimates of intelligence to provide a more accurate 
assessment of the size and significance of gender differences in self-perceptions. In 
addition to considering studies using self-concept measures and self-estimate measures, the 
study will investigate key moderators in hopes of further clarifying the current literature.  
1.7 Overall Relationship 
As previously discussed, most studies investigating overall academic self-concept 
have found significant differences favoring men. Although the finding of gender 
differences has been consistent, the magnitude of the effect has varied. Based on 
Syzmanowicz and Furnham’s (2011) recent findings, I expect to find a moderate difference 
(d = 0.5-0.79) favoring men on overall academic self-concept. Following trends in previous 
meta-analyses, I anticipate that men  rate themselves significantly higher than women on 
mathematical self-concept (Syzmanowicz and Furnham, 2011; Wilgenbusch & Merrell, 
1999). Finally, I expect trivial gender differences in verbal self-concept.  
A power analysis equation for main effects using mixed-effects models could not 
be found. Data from Syzmanowicz and Furnham’s (2011) meta-analysis were used to 
approximate power using fixed-effect method power analysis. Using sample sizes and 
effect sizes from the 2011 article, power for an effect size of .10 was greater than 80% for 
mathematical, verbal, and overall academic self-concept at the α = .05 level. 
Hypothesis 1: The first meta-analysis will reveal a significant gender difference in overall 
academic self-concept, favoring males. It is expected that this effect size will be moderate 
(d = 0.50-0.79). 
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Hypothesis 2: The second meta-analysis will reveal a significant gender difference in 
mathematical self-concept, favoring males. It is expected that this effect size will be 
moderate (d = 0.50-0.79). 
Hypothesis 3: The third meta-analysis will reveal trivial gender differences in verbal self-
concept, favoring males (d < 0.10). 
1.8 Influence of Moderator Variables 
 In addition to examining the main effects for gender differences in mathematical, 
verbal, and overall academic self-concept, moderator variables will be considered. Based 
on sociocultural theory and cognitive social learning theory, I expect sex-role orientation 
to significantly moderate of the magnitude of gender differences in self-concept. Also, due 
to sex-role expectations and societal norms changing over time, I expect date of publication 
to be a significant moderator as well. Finally, due to men’s tendency to make self-
enhancing evaluations when given ambiguous assessments, I expect explicit measures of 
self-concept domains such as the SDQ-III to have lesser gender differences. I discuss each 
of these moderators in greater detail below. 
1.8.1 Bem’s sex-role orientation  
Many researchers have used Bem’s Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), which is grounded 
in Bem’s gender schema theory, to measure the potential moderating effect of gender role 
on academic self-concept (Erdwins, Small, & Gross, 1980; Storek & Furnham, 2012; 
Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2013). The BSRI is a measure of psychological sex-role 
orientation. Subjects can be typed as feminine, masculine, androgynous (having both 
feminine and masculine qualities), or undifferentiated (possessing neither feminine nor 
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masculine traits; Bem, 1974). Bem (1981) posited that the more sex-typed a person is (i.e. 
being feminine or masculine), the more likely he/she is to adhere to stereotypical gender 
roles. Rammstedt and Rammsayer (2002) supported this theory, and found that men’s 
overestimation of their intelligence is relative to the strength of their adherence to gender 
roles. Few studies have examined the relationship between sex-type and gender differences 
in self-concept, and findings have been inconsistent (Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2013). 
However, based on Bem’s gender schema theory and previous research on gender roles, I 
expect that gender-typed people (masculine males and feminine females) will have greater 
gender differences than non-gender-typed people (both/neither sex typed: 
androgynous/undifferentiated). 
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of gender differences will be moderated such that samples of 
gender-typed men and women will have larger gender differences in all three self-concept 
domains than samples of non-gender-typed men and women.  
1.8.2 Type of measure  
In general, people assess themselves more positively than they assess other people 
(Brown, 2012). This tendency for positive evaluation on different traits and abilities 
(known as the ‘better-than-average effect’; Alicke, 1985) is strengthened when the trait 
being evaluated is ambiguous (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Felson, 1981). 
Men are particularly likely to make self-enhancing evaluations due to their tendency to 
recall only positive feedback (Thomas, 1991). When assessments are ambiguous, men are 
able to use multiple and variable evaluation criteria when estimating their intelligences, 
and are likely to recall positive experiences on which to base their estimations. Compared 
to women, who generally recall both positive and negative feedback, men’s evaluations 
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become inflated (von Stumm, 2014). This ability to choose multiple criteria on which to 
base an estimation is exaggerated when the measure is ambiguous. Therefore, for verbal 
and mathematical self-concept, it is expected that gender differences will be exacerbated 
on ambiguous measures (identified by a single item questionnaire for each domain).  
Hypothesis 5: Gender differences on verbal, mathematical, and overall academic self-
concept will be larger for measures utilizing ambiguous questionnaires, compared to more 
thorough assessments such as the SDQ-III.  
1.8.3 Year of publication  
The year of publication should influence gender differences in academic self-
concept because gender stereotypes have changed over time. Hattie (1992) suggested that 
self-concept changes over generations, and Shipstone and Burt (1973) suggested that 
stereotypes about intelligence may change over time as well. Due to men and women’s 
roles becoming more comparable, it has been suggested that the magnitude of gender 
differences in various domains is decreasing (Byrne, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Hyde, 2005). 
Therefore, studies from more recent decades are hypothesized to have smaller effect sizes. 
Hypothesis 6: Year of publication will significantly moderate gender differences in all 
three meta-analyses so that differences decrease as studies become more recent.  
The following variables will be investigated as moderators in an exploratory 
fashion. 
1.8.4 Sex of authors  
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Recent meta-analyses found that male and female researchers tend to produce 
findings that shed a more favorable light on their own gender (Eagly & Wood, 2013). 
Gender composition of the authors was significantly related to the effect sizes in studies, 
with all-male research teams producing larger mean effect sizes than groups with women 
(Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2011). Therefore, I expect larger sex differences in studies 
conducted by all or majority male authors, compared to research teams consisting of all or 
majority females. 
1.8.5 Nationality  
With research now being conducted cross-culturally, it is important to investigate 
variation across nations. Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2011) found a significant moderating 
effect of nationality, and after dividing studies into sub-samples, discovered that “Western” 
samples had significantly larger gender differences in mathematical self-estimates 
compared to non-Western samples. A significant interaction effect of sex by nation was 
found by von Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham (2009) in their study across 12 
nations. The authors suggested that individualistic societies might be more likely to 
overestimate their abilities. 
1.8.6 Age  
Though little research has examined how gender differences in self-concept vary 
with age, gender stereotype development research suggests that the acknowledgement and 
adherence to traditional gender roles increases with age (Kessels, 2005). Even when 
limiting the sample to elementary and middle school-aged children, 8th grade girls hold 
significantly stronger gender-stereotypical beliefs about math compared to 4th grade girls 
(d = 0.37; Kurtz-Costes, Copping, Rowley, & Kinlaw, 2014). The hypothesis that older 
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samples have larger gender differences than younger samples was supported by 
Syzmanowicz & Furnham (2011), and is expected in the current analysis as well.  
1.9 Objective Measures of Intelligence 
 Furnham (2001) posited that gender differences in self-estimations of ability exist 
because of the “male hubris, female humility” effect. This effect suggests that men are 
likely to overestimate their intellectual abilities, whereas women are likely to 
underestimate their abilities. However, without a comparison of objective measures of 
intelligence, there is no way to know whether men and women are making inaccurate 
assessments. Ackerman and Wolman (2007) found that people are not accurate when 
assessing their abilities, and correlations between estimated and psychometrically tested 
intelligence scores rarely exceed r = .50. Studies have found gender differences in 
academic self-concept that exceed differences on psychometric intelligence (Furnham, 
Moutafi, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2005), but the number of studies reporting this 
information is limited. When possible, I will obtain gender differences for studies 
examining objective measures and self-estimates of intelligence, and will compare the 







2.1 Literature Search and Study Selection 
 To identify relevant studies, three primary strategies were used. First, computerized 
literature searches were conducted using primary psychology (PsychINFO and CogNet) 
and education (ERIC) databases, as well as more general research sources such as Google 
Scholar and Web of Science. To search the databases, the keywords self-appraisal, self-
assess, self-concept, Self-Description Questionnaire, self-estimate, self-report, self-
evaluation, perceived ability, and perceived competence were crossed with academic 
intelligence, achievement, aptitude, intelligence, and multiple-intelligence using the 
Boolean operator AND. Asterisks were used at the end of search terms to allow for a 
truncation. The database searches resulted in a total of 5,652 independent peer-reviewed 
articles for inclusion consideration. Attempts to reduce the number of irrelevant articles 
were made by removing generic search terms. However, due to the interchangeability of 
self-concept terms, it was critical to use the full array of search terms to capture pertinent 
articles.  
The second strategy used to locate articles was to scan reference lists of the studies 
identified through the database searches. Finally, researchers currently conducting studies 
relating to academic self-concept were contacted to obtain any in-press or unpublished 
studies, as well as to request more specific data from published articles related to my 
hypotheses. No additional studies or data were received. 
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Articles from the database searches and reference scans were evaluated for 
inclusion in two phases. The initial phase required that the title or abstract alluded to 
measures of overall academic, verbal, or mathematical self-concepts. After removing 
articles with irrelevant titles or abstracts, 2,147 publications remained. These articles were 
read and evaluated based on the following criteria: (a) the study included both men and 
women; (b) the sample had a mean age of at least 16 years; (c) the study contained original 
data; (d) the study measured overall academic, verbal, or mathematical self-estimates or 
self-concepts; and (e) the article included statistics that enabled the calculation of 
appropriate gender comparison effect sizes. Although it is common for meta-analysts to set 
missing effect sizes to zero, Hedges and Becker (1986) strongly advise against it due to the 
reduction in effect size magnitude and the artificial suppression of variability. Therefore, 
if studies reported an effect but did not report quantitative information such as means and 
standard deviations or effect-sizes, the studies were excluded.  
Overall, 109 articles met the defined criteria. Most of the excluded articles were 
removed due to not containing enough data to compute effect sizes (e.g., results were 
reported in aggregate and not by gender) and additional data could not be obtained from 
the authors. In four cases, authors reported multiple estimates of the same construct from 
the same sample (i.e. two self-estimates of verbal ability measures). In these cases, a mean 
effect size was computed to retain the independence of the estimates (Hedges & Becker, 
1986). The included articles yielded 131 studies or independent samples and a total of 237 
effect sizes. There were 82 effect sizes for overall academic self-concept, 74 effect sizes 
for verbal self-concept, and 81 effect sizes for mathematical self-concept.  
2.2 Coding Studies 
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A standardized coding scheme based on the selection of moderator variables and 
required data for computing effect sizes was developed. Some variables were coded at the 
level of the individual study or independent sample, others were coded at the level of the 
individual effect size. 
The following variables were coded at the level of the individual study or independent 
sample: 
Author gender proportion. Four categories were used (1 = majority male; 2 = 
majority female; 3 = equal number of male and female authors; 4 = undetermined). 
Gender of each author was determined by the gender pronouns used in the author’s 
publications or the bio on their institution’s website.  
Country of origin. Seven categories were used (1 = Americas; 2 = United 
Kingdom; 3 = Europe [excluding the UK]; 4 = Australia or New Zealand; 5 = Africa 
[including the Middle East]; 6 = Asia; 7 = Multiple locations). Country of origin 
was determined by where the data were collected. If the location of data collection 
was unknown, the location of the first author’s affiliation was used. After all studies 
were coded, these were combined into three levels (Western, Non-Western, and 
Combined) due to multiple categories having less than 5 effect sizes.  
Participant mean age. The mean age of the sample. If the mean age was not 
reported and the sample was described as “undergraduates” or “psychology 
students,” a mean age of 20 was used. If a student sample was reported with a grade 
level but no age, 5 was added to the grade to approximate age.  
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Publication year. The year of the publication. If article included the year in which 
the data were collected, this year was used instead of publication date.  
The following variables were coded at the level of the individual effect size: 
Construct measured. Three categories were used (1 = Academic self-concept; 2 = 
Self-estimates of ability [defined as single-item measures or an average of single-
item measures of multiple intelligences]; 3 = Other/unknown). 
Assessment used. Eight categories were used (1 = Academic Self-Concept Scale; 
2 = Multiple Intelligences Inventory; 3 = Self-Concept of Ability Scale; 4 = Self-
Description Questionnaire II; 5 = Self-Description Questionnaire III; 6 = Self-
Rating Scale of College Ability; 7 = Other; 8 = Unspecified). 
Format of the assessment. Seven categories were used (1 = Likert-like items; 2 = 
Labelled bell curve; 3 = Mean score of 100; 4 = Visual analogue scale; 5 = 
Percentile scale; 6 = Other).  
Number of items. Number of items used for assessing self-concept.  
Specificity of items. Four categories were used (1 = Domain [e.g., “Mathematics” 
or “English”]; 2 = Sub-domain [e.g., “Algebra” or “Vocabulary”]; 3 = Task level 
[e.g., “I enjoy creating puns” or “I am good at word puzzles”]; 4 = Unknown). 
Gender role orientation. Four categories were anticipated (1 = Primarily 
Feminine, 2 = Primarily Masculine, 3 = Primarily Undifferentiated, 4 = Primarily 
Androgynous). Although gender role orientation was a hypothesized moderator of 
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gender differences in overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concept, the 
search of the literature did not result in enough studies to be analyzed. Only four 
studies reported data and, of those studies, none of the findings were reported in a 
way that could be standardized for analysis. Despite contacting authors, no usable 
data were obtained.  
2.3 Inter-rater Reliability 
Twenty-five articles were randomly selected to be coded by the author and a second 
coder. These articles resulted in a total of thirty-two independent samples being coded for 
interrater reliability analysis. The average interrater reliability was satisfying at κ = .94. 
The lowest kappa statistic was for Overall Academic Self-Concept Format (κ = .81) and 
the highest was for Country of Origin, Overall Academic Self-Concept Construct 
Measured, and Mathematical Assessment Used (κ = 1.0). All discrepancies were discussed 
and, if necessary, additional clarification and definition was added to the coding guide. 
After the adjustments, the remaining studies were coded by the author.  
2.4 Statistical Analyses 
To approximate the magnitude of gender differences in academic self-concept, 
three separate meta-analyses were conducted on overall academic self-concept, verbal self-
concept, and mathematical self-concept. Analyses were performed using formulas 
provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001) and Hedges and Becker (1986).  
The effect size, g, was calculated and defined as the mean for males minus the mean 
for females, divided by the pooled sample standard deviation (therefore, positive values 
indicated that males had higher self-ratings than females did). If means and standard 
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deviations were not available, effect sizes were computed using results of F-tests or t-tests. 
When insufficient information was available to compute effect sizes, the studies were 
eliminated as noted in the Method section. Due to the tendency for an upward bias in small 
samples, all effect sizes were weighted by an inverted variance resulting in the corrected 
effect size, d (Hedges & Becker, 1986; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
To avoid the distortion of the analyses due to outliers, Huffcut and Arthur’s (1995) 
sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic (SAMD) was used to determine studies 
for exclusion after the corrected d-values were obtained. This method of identifying 
outliers is more analytically precise due to the consideration of sample size. Based on the 
analysis, two outliers were removed for overall academic self-concept, four outliers were 
removed for verbal self-concept, and two outliers were removed for mathematical self-
concept. For the interpretation of the effect sizes, Cohen’s (1988) framework was used; d-
values of d = 0.20 to d = 0.49, d = 0.50 to d = 0.79, and d > 0.80 will be characterized as 
small, medium, and large, respectively. Effect sizes of d < 0.20 will be considered 
negligible.  
Initial analyses of homogeneity were computed for each self-concept measure using 
fixed-effect models. When the null hypothesis of homogeneity was rejected, mixed-effects 
models were used to evaluate the presence of moderator effects. In contrast to the fixed-
effect model (which assumes that all variation is systematic), and the random effects model 
(which assumes that none of the variation is systematic), the mixed-effects model assumes 
that the moderation of between-subject variables is systematic, but that there is a remaining 
unmeasured random effect in the effect size distribution in addition to sampling error 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In mixed-effects models, a random-effects variance component 
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is computed based on the residual homogeneity after moderator effects have been 
considered. Then, inverse variance weights are recalculated using the random-effects 
variance. Lipsey and Wilson (2001) suggest that the mixed-effects model provides the 
lowest Type I error rate while still maximizing power for identifying moderator effects.  
Additionally, rather than using the Hedges and Olkin (1985) method of adjusting 
the Type I error rate when using multiple Bonferroni comparisons across a meta-analysis, 
meta-regression was used to examine the relationship of the hypothesized moderators 
(publication year and number of items) on effect magnitude as recommended by Lipsey 
(2009) and Pigott (2012). This allows for the simultaneous consideration of the predictor 
variables rather than examining one moderator at a time through multiple ANOVAs which 
can lead to an enlarged Type I error rate. Single variable analyses were conducted for 
exploratory moderators using analogues to the analysis of variance for categorical variables 
and meta-regression models for continuous variables. If exploratory analyses resulted in 
significance for categorical variables, post hoc contrasts were performed using the 
Bonferroni method (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). For studies that included measures of both 
self-estimated intelligence constructs and objective measures of intelligence, analogues to 
the analysis of variation were used to compare the effect sizes. All analyses were conducted 







 The meta-analyses of overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concepts 
revealed a similar pattern of sex differences across all constructs with men reporting higher 
self-estimates of ability and self-concepts than women reported on average. The largest 
difference was for mathematical self-concept (d = 0.41) and the smallest difference was for 
verbal self-concept (d = 0.13). For a summary of results, see Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of Meta-Analysis Results, as Moderated by Number of Items and 
Publication Year 
Self-concept domain R2 Qmodel Βnumitems Βpubyear k 
Overall academic self-concept .303 33.31 -.0109 .0049 80 
Verbal self-concept .023 1.39 .0106 .0018 70 
Mathematical self-concept .045 3.24 -.0269 -.0021 73 
 
3.1 Overall Academic Self-Concept 
3.1.1 Magnitude of gender differences  
To test Hypothesis 1, the weighted mean effect size of gender differences in overall 
academic self-concept was calculated and evaluated using confidence intervals. The 80 
effect sizes ranged from d = -0.30 to d = 0.92, with a weighted mean effect size of d = 0.32 
and a 95% confidence interval of 0.29 < d < 0.34. This indicates that, on average, males 
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estimated their overall academic ability approximately one third of a standard deviation 
higher than females. Though the effect size did not reach the predicted magnitude, the 
statistical significance of the mean difference supports Hypothesis 1.  
Six cases reported women estimating their overall academic ability higher than 
men. Of the remaining 74 effect sizes favoring men, 14 cases reported negligible sex 
differences (d < 0.20), 42 cases reported small sex differences (0.20 < d < 0.49), 15 cases 
reported moderate sex differences (0.5 < d < 0.79), and three cases reported large sex 
differences (0.8 < d). The total participant sample size for these 80 effect sizes was 20,369, 
which corresponds to an average sample size of approximately 255 participants per study 
(the smallest sample was 40, and the largest sample size was 2,589). In order to determine 
whether the variability among the effect sizes was greater than would be expected from 
sampling error alone, homogeneity analysis was conducted using methods described by 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001). Results of the analysis revealed that the set of effect sizes was 
significantly heterogeneous, Qt(79) = 221.46, p < .001, suggesting that the assumptions of 
the fixed-effect model should be rejected. Given that the Q statistic suggested that each 
effect size did not estimate a common population mean, the mixed-effects model was used 
to detect the presence of moderators. 
3.1.2 Hypothesized moderators  
As previously discussed, the mixed-effects model assumes that the effect size 
variation can be divided into two components: systematic relationships between 
characteristics of the studies and the effect sizes, and random study-level variance (Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001). This model enables the researcher to evaluate the influence of between-
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study moderator variables and both unmeasured random variance and subject-level 
sampling error.  
Weighted least squares regression using the method of moments based estimate of 
the random effects variance component was used to evaluate moderator hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5 anticipated that the publication year of the study would moderate the 
magnitude of effect sizes such that more recent studies would have smaller effect sizes and 
older studies would have larger effect sizes. Hypothesis 6 predicted that as the number of 
items on a measure increased, the effect size for gender differences in self-concept would 
decrease. Therefore, publication year and number of items were entered into a mixed-
effects weighted least squares regression as predictor variables. The model significantly 
predicted heterogeneity among the effects, Qmodel(2) = 33.31, p < .0001. This suggests that 
the relationships captured by the model are stronger than we would expect by chance 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). As predicted, the number of items used 
to assess overall academic self-concept moderated gender differences in the expected 
direction (β = -.01, p < .0001). The date of publication also significantly moderated gender 
differences, however, it did so in the opposite direction as was anticipated (β = .01, p < 
.0001). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported for overall academic self-concept, but 
Hypothesis 6 was not. 
3.2 Verbal Self-Concept 
3.2.1 Magnitude of gender differences  
The weighted mean effect size, d, of the gender differences in verbal self-concept 
was .13, which indicates a minimal difference favoring men as predicted by Hypothesis 2. 
The 70 effect sizes ranged from d = -0.42 to d = 0.56 and had a 95% confidence interval 
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of 0.10 < d < 0.16. In 13 studies, effect sizes ranged from -0.30 to -0.01 favoring females. 
Among the samples with effect sizes favoring males, 34 cases reported negligible sex 
differences (0.00 < d < 0.20), 21 cases reported small sex differences (0.20 < d < 0.49), 
and two cases reported moderate effect sizes (0.50 < d < 0.79). There were no effect sizes 
for gender differences in verbal self-concept that reached large differences. The total 
participant sample was 17,508, which averages to approximately 250 participants per 
sample.  
 To determine the appropriateness of moving forward with moderator analysis, a 
test of homogeneity was conducted. The homogeneity statistic revealed substantial 
variability within the sample of verbal self-concept studies, Qt(69) = 202.34, p < .001, 
leading to the rejection of fixed-effect assumptions. Therefore, the mixed-effects model 
was applied to the data. 
3.2.2 Hypothesized moderators  
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were also evaluated for verbal self-concept using the weighted 
least squares regression model containing publication year and number of items as 
predictors. However, unlike overall academic self-concept, this model fit the verbal self-
concept data poorly and did not significantly predict heterogeneity among the effect sizes 
for verbal self-concept (Qmodel(2) = 1.39, p = .49). Therefore, the individual moderators, 
publication year and number of items, were not investigated. 
3.3 Mathematical Self-Concept 
3.3.1 Magnitude of gender differences  
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The third and final meta-analysis also resulted in a significant weighted mean effect 
size favoring men (d = 0.42). The 79 effect sizes for mathematical self-concept ranged 
from d = -0.16 to d = 0.92 and had a 95% confidence interval of 0.39 < d < 0.44. In all but 
three studies, men’s estimations of their mathematical intelligence were higher than 
women’s estimations. Only eight cases reported negligible sex differences (d < 0.20), 35 
cases reported small sex differences (0.20 < d < 0.49), 28 cases reported moderate sex 
differences (0.50 < d < 0.79), and 5 cases reported large differences (0.80 < d). An average 
of 254 participants per sample resulted in a total participant sample of 20,057.  
 As with both overall academic and verbal self-concepts, the homogeneity statistic 
for mathematical self-concept effect sizes revealed substantial variability within the sample 
of studies, Qt(78) = 234.23, p < .001. This led to the rejection of fixed-effect assumptions 
and continuance with the mixed-effects model. 
3.3.2 Hypothesized moderators  
Using the weighted least squares regression model, publication year and number of 
items were evaluated as moderators. As with verbal self-concept, this model fit the 
mathematical self-concept data poorly and did not predict heterogeneity among the effect 
sizes, Qmodel(2) = 3.24, p = .198. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were not supported. 
3.4 Exploratory Analyses 
3.4.1 Age, author gender, and country of origin  
Exploratory analyses of age, author gender ratio, and country of origin were 
conducted using meta-regression or analogues to ANOVA for overall academic self-
concept, verbal self-concept, and mathematical self-concept. These analyses resulted in 
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non-significant findings; relevant statistics can be found in Tables 2 and 3. It is interesting 
to note that when run as a mixed-effects model, none of the exploratory moderators were 
found to be significant. However, when replicating fixed-effect methods used by Furnham 
and Syzmanowicz (2011), the results for many of the moderators were significant. 
3.4.2 Objectively measured intelligence  
Effect sizes for gender differences in objective measures of overall academic, 
verbal, and mathematical intelligence were compared to the related self-estimate measure 
effect sizes using analogues to ANOVA. For each measure of intelligence, fewer than 10 
samples reported gender differences in both objective and self-concept measures to be used 
in analysis.  
Overall academic intelligence had the largest k, with six studies reporting the 
necessary statistics for analysis. The weighted mean effect size for gender differences in 
overall academic self-concept was d = 0.37 (favoring men) and the weighted mean effect 
size for gender differences in objective intelligence was d = -0.22, (favoring women). The 
finding was insignificant, Qbetween(1) = 2.05, p = .153. For verbal intelligence, only three 
studies were available. The resulting d-value for gender differences in objective verbal 
intelligence was 0.19 and the d-value for verbal self-concept favored women (d = -0.13). 
The result of the analogue to ANOVA was non-significant, Qbetween(1) = 2.73, p = .099. 
The final comparison was between objective measures of mathematical intelligence and 
mathematical self-concept (k = 4). For mathematical intelligence, men scored higher on 
both the self-concept measures (d = 0.43) and objective measures (d = 0.98). This contrast 




 This study used meta-analytic techniques to investigate the effect sizes of gender 
differences in overall, mathematical, and verbal self-concept. The results support the 
hypotheses of mean effect size differences favoring men in all three domains. However, 
many of the moderator analyses resulted in null findings.  
Males reported significantly higher ratings of self-concept than females for overall 
academic (d = 0.32), verbal (d = 0.13), and mathematical (d = 0.41) self-concepts. Although 
not as large in magnitude as expected, gender differences in overall academic and 
mathematical self-concepts favored men as anticipated (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Hypothesis 
3 was also supported with men scoring significantly higher on measures of verbal self-
concept compared to women, though the effect size was negligible as predicted.  
4.1 Hypothesized Moderator Variables 
Given the results of the test for heterogeneity, analyses for hypothesized and 
exploratory moderator variables were conducted for overall academic, verbal, and 
mathematical self-concept. Although many of the hypotheses for moderators were not 
supported or were unable to be explored, these outcomes suggest possibilities for future 
research and highlight potential methodological weaknesses in previous research. In 
addition to the exploratory analyses, my hypothesized moderators were sex-type, 
publication year, and number of items.  
Based on findings that sex-typed individuals are more likely to adhere to traditional 
gender roles, I anticipated that comparisons of gender-typed individuals would result in 
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larger disparities between men and women than comparisons of non-gender-typed persons. 
Gender-type, as measured by Bem’s Sex-Role Inventory, could potentially influence the 
magnitude of gender differences for multiple reasons. It has been proposed that certain 
domains of intelligence are stereotypically gendered, with math being traditionally seen as 
a male domain and verbal ability being typed as feminine (Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, 
Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006; Nosek et al., 2009). Additionally, Furnham, Hosoe, and Li-
Pang Tang (2001) posited that, at least in Western cultures, general intelligence is judged 
by weighting male-normed components of intelligence (mathematical ability and spatial 
ability) more heavily than stereotypically female aspects of intelligence (verbal ability). 
This focus on math and spatial ability could lead to the inflation of gender differences on 
overall academic self-concept measures. If intelligence is seen as male-normative and men 
are expected to score higher than women, gender-typed individuals would be more likely 
to adhere to these stereotypes and under- or overestimate their cognitive ability 
accordingly. This moderator would lead to an increase in gender differences in overall 
academic and mathematical self-concept, and reduce the magnitude of differences in verbal 
self-concept. 
 Ideally, the influence of gender-type on the magnitude of sex differences on 
measures of self-concept would be investigated by comparing the difference between sex-
typed males and females to the difference between androgynous or undifferentiated males 
and females. However, the already limited number of studies exploring gender-type and 
self-concept did not structure their analyses in ways that allowed for standardization for a 
meta-analysis. Due to this limitation, I was unable to be explore the relationship between 
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sex-type and gender differences in self-concept. Future directions for research in this area 
and the potential implications are discussed in later sections.    
 The influence of publication year and number of items on the magnitude of gender 
differences varied across overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concepts. For 
overall academic self-concept, the regression model using publication year and number of 
items as predictor variables explained significant variability across the effect sizes. Both 
moderators were significant, though publication year was significant in the opposite 
directionality as anticipated.   
 It was hypothesized that as the number of items on a measure of self-concept 
increased, the magnitude of gender differences would decrease due to the ambiguity of the 
single item measures. Though the distinction between self-assessed intelligence and 
academic self-concept continues to be debated (Freund & Kasten, 2012; Peterson & 
Whiteman, 2007), one consistent difference is how the constructs are most frequently 
measured. Due to self-concept being comprised of cognition, affect, and behavior (Byrne, 
1996), measures of academic self-concept are generally composed of multiple items (e.g., 
the Self-Description Questionnaire III [Marsh, 1992] or the Academic Self Concept Scale 
[Reynolds, Ramirez, Magriña, & Allen, 1980]). Conversely, measures of self-assessed 
intelligence or self-estimates of intelligence commonly use Furnham’s (2000) method of 
requesting a single estimate for each domain using an image of a normal distribution with 
100 as its mean.  
The importance of the number of items on a measure is two-fold. First, the tendency 
for individuals to assess themselves more positively than they assess others (Brown, 2012) 
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is exacerbated when the trait being evaluated is measured via ambiguous items (Dunning, 
Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Felson, 1981). When the criteria for making an evaluation 
of oneself is vague, it allows participants to use disparate criteria and a broader range of 
experiences on which to base their assessments. Secondly, the difference in how men and 
women interpret information related to failures and successes could also be impacted by 
the number of items on a measure. When recalling self-performance and commentary from 
others, women recall both positive and negative feedback while males retain only positive 
experiences (Roberts, 1991). This masculine trait of positive recollection leads to men 
inflating their self-concept on all measures of intelligence and results in women having 
seemingly more humility (Syzmanowiz & Furnham, 2013). The likelihood of men to rely 
primarily on positive experiences is further exacerbated by items that do not provide 
parameters or specific criteria to guide the self-estimations (Thomas, 1991; von Stumm, 
2014). For overall academic self-concept the number of items hypothesis was supported 
and was a significant moderator of mean effect size differences between men and women.  
The second moderator that was analyzed was publication year. It has been argued 
that gender differences across a variety of domains are declining due to women’s roles 
becoming more comparable to men’s roles (Byrne, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Hyde, 2005). 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that more recent studies would have smaller gender 
differences than older studies. This hypothesis was not supported and, for overall academic 
self-concept, the result was significant in the opposite direction such that newer articles 
had larger effect sizes. Though this finding was unexpected, after considering the 
magnitude of gender differences in self-concept when compared to gender differences in 
objective ability, it is possibly explained by the type of construct being measured. Recent 
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studies of the gender similarities hypothesis found gender differences to be small to 
nonexistent overall and for publication year to significantly moderate the magnitude of the 
effect sizes such that newer studies have small effect sizes than older studies (Hyde, 2005). 
However, the literature on the gender similarities hypothesis primarily focuses on objective 
measures of traits such as cognitive abilities and psychopathology. When examining 
constructs dealing with self-perception or self-reported traits, the similarity hypothesis 
might not hold true. Zell, Krizan, and Teeter (2015) found that the largest d-value in their 
metasynthesis of gender differences was for masculine versus feminine traits (d = .73). 
Gender stereotypes continue to be salient in many cultures and research shows that children 
and adults alike tend to conform to societal expectations of gender norms (Eagly & Wood, 
2013). It is possible that, although gender differences in objective intelligence are 
diminishing over time, the long-held belief that males perform better than females on 
intelligence measures continues to be perpetuated and is leading to discrepant academic 
self-concepts between men and women. 
For both mathematical and verbal self-concepts, the regression models using 
publication year and number of items did not account for a significant amount of variability 
across the effect sizes. Although the moderator hypotheses were not supported, the results 
still warrant additional investigation. For number of items, it is possible that the level of 
ambiguity across the various measures of self-concept were not differentiated enough to 
influence the magnitude of gender differences. For overall academic self-concept, the 
number of items on a measure ranged from one to 40, but for mathematical and verbal self-
concept, the number of items only ranged from one to 10. It could be that measures with 
more items did not provide enough specification to lessen the impact of men’s likelihood 
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for positive recollection. In the future, it would be interesting to learn what experiences 
individuals are using to determine their self-ratings and see how the level of ambiguity of 
a measure might impact those determinations. The reasons for publication year not being 
a significant moderator for mathematical and verbal self-concepts could potentially be the 
same as those outlined for overall academic self-concept.  
4.2 Exploratory Moderator Variables 
 Age, author gender ratio, and country of origin were investigated as exploratory 
moderator variables for overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concepts. All 
findings were null. Though there was theoretical justification for the exploration of each of 
the moderators, the primary support from previous research came from Syzmanowicz and 
Furnham’s (2011) meta-analysis. It is possible that the current meta-analyses did not 
replicate the 2011 study due to differences in the samples identified for analysis, but it 
seems more likely that the inconsistency in findings came from the use of more stringent 
methodology. Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2011) used fixed-effect models for all analyses 
of gender differences in self-estimated intelligences. Though fixed-effect models were 
once the norm for meta-analyses, they have been criticized and more rigorous methods 
have been developed (Hedges & Vevea, 1998; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The major 
criticism of fixed-effect models is that the method assumes all variability among the effect 
sizes is wholly systematic and can be completely accounted for by the moderators. This 
assumption is generally untenable and leads to an inflation of the Type I error rate 
(Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges & Vevea, 1998; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). It is possible 
that my findings did not replicate those of Syzmanowicz and Furnham (2011) due to the 
inflation of Type I error rates that come with fixed-effect models. In fact, when I conducted 
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my exploratory moderator analyses using the same methods as the 2011 meta-analysis, 
many of the previously null outcomes were significant (see Tables 2 and 3 for 
comparisons).  
4.3 Objective Intelligence 
Despite finding significant gender differences favoring men on all three measures 
of self-concept, it is unlikely that these gender differences reflect inequalities on objective 
intelligence measures. In an attempt to compare the magnitude of gender differences 
between self-estimated intelligence and measured intelligence, the weighted mean effect 
sizes were evaluated. However, due to the very limited number of studies reporting gender 
differences for both self-concept and psychometrically evaluated intelligence, the results 
of this study are not likely to generalize.  
All comparisons between self-concept and objective intelligence measures were 
likely insignificant due to a lack of power. As explained by Hedges and Piggott (2004), 
moderator analyses are conceptually the same as interaction analyses and therefore have 
less power than tests for main effects in the same designs. Therefore, given the very small 
ks for each measure, it is unsurprising that the tests were not sensitive enough to detect 
differences. For overall intelligence, only six studies reported both self-report measures 
and objective measures of ability; for verbal intelligence, only three studies were available. 
Additionally, the limited number of available studies that reported findings in a comparable 
way makes it unlikely that the analyses would be generalizable.    
The null results for mathematical ability were particularly unexpected when we 
examine the weighted mean effect sizes for objective intelligence. Though males did, at 
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Table 2. Summary of Meta-Analysis Results, as Moderated by Categorical Exploratory 
Sample Characteristics 
 Mixed-Effects  Fixed Effects 
Sample Characteristics Q df p Mean ES  Q df p Mean ES 
Overall academic self-concept 
Author gender ratio        
   Total 74.24 79 .63 .33  221.46 79 <.001 .31 
   Between 0.59 2 .74   1.19 2 .55  
   Within 73.65 77 .58   220.26 77 <.001  
   More male authors 45.24 49 .63 .34  137.93 49 <.001 .31 
   More female authors 18.82 17 .34 .35  50.54 17 <.001 .35 
   Equal authors 9.59 11 .57 .28  31.79 11 <.001 .31 
          
Nationality          
   Total 77.06 79 .54 .33  221.46 79 <.001 .31 
   Between 2.41 2 .29   8.95 2 .01  
   Within 74.65 77 .55   212.51 77 <.001  
   Western Samples 63.37 63 .46 .32  178.55 63 <.001 .30 
   Non-Western Samples 10.43 10 .40 .36  31.25 10 <.001 .34 
   Mixed Samples 0.85 4 .93 .47  2.69 4 .61 .47 
Verbal self-concept 
Author gender ratio          
   Total 54.47 69 .89 .10  202.34 69 <.001 .13 
   Between 0.67 2 .71   0.42 2 .81  
   Within 53.79 67 .87   201.91 67 <.001  
   More male authors 14.15 35 .99 .11  42.79 35 .17 .13 
   More female authors 25.19 23 .34 .08  121.91 23 <.001 .13 
   Equal authors 14.45 9 .11 .13  31.22 9 <.001 .10 
          
Nationality          
   Total 51.13 69 .50 .13  202.34 69 <.001 .13 
   Between 1.37 2 .94   5.46 2 .49  
   Within 49.76 67 .94   196.88 67 <.001  
   Western Samples 27.63 47 .98 .13  74.54 47 <.01 .10 
   Non-Western Samples 19.51 16 .24 .11  111.00 16 <.001 .15 
   Mixed Samples 2.62 4 .62 .24  11.34 4 .02 .22 
Mathematical self-concept 
Author gender ratio          
   Total 78.18 78 .25 .43  234.23 78 <.001 .41 
   Between 2.79 2 .49   1.29 2 .52  
   Within 75.41 76 .47   232.93 76 <.001  
   More male authors 32.22 37 .69 .48  75.49 37 <.001 .42 
   More female authors 21.79 20 .35 .38  70.42 20 <.001 .44 
   Equal authors 21.39 19 .32 .39  87.02 19 <.001 .39 
Nationality          
   Total 78.59 78 .36 .43  234.23 78 <.001 .41 
   Between 2.06 2 .46   4.69 2 .09  
   Within 76.53 76 .46   229.53 76 <.001  
   Western Samples 56.05 54 .39 .46  165.53 54 <.001 .43 
   Non-Western Samples 15.11 17 .59 .39  51.43 17 <.001 .37 
   Mixed Samples 5.37 5 .37 .10  12.57 5 .03 .35 
Note. P-values < .05 are in boldface. Mean ES = Weighted mean effect size. 
Note. P-values < .05 are in boldface          
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Table 3. Summary of Meta-Analysis Results, as Moderated by Age 
 
one time, outperform females on mathematical abilities (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), this 
stereotypical “truth” has been challenged by multiple reviews. In fact, recent meta-analytic 
results show a decline in the magnitude of gender differences on measures of mathematical 
performance since the initial evaluation of the literature in 1974 (Hyde, 2014). Recent 
findings suggest that the difference overall is minimal (sometimes even nonexistent, d = -
.069; Voyer & Voyer, 2014) and that larger sex differences in mathematics only occur in 
specific instances (Lindberg, et al. 2010). However, the weighted mean average for 
mathematical ability of the four studies identified for this analysis was d =.98 (with a range 
of d = 0.07 to d = 2.34), far exceeding the results of any meta-analytic review in the last 
thirty years.  This exceptionally large value was possibly driven by extreme effect sizes 
due to having such a limited sample of studies in the analysis.  
4.4 Summary 
 Many of the results were null or ran contrary to expectation, but potentially 
informative results were observed for mean effect size differences and for moderators of 
overall intelligence. In all three self-concept domains, men estimated their own intelligence 
to be significantly higher than females estimated theirs. Though the effect sizes were 
smaller than anticipated for overall academic and mathematical self-concept, the 
 Mixed-Effects    Fixed Effects 
Self-concept domain R2 Qmodel β p k  R2 Qmodel β p k 
Overall academic self-
concept 
.0356 2.79 .0060 .0943 79  .0535 11.82 .0073 <.001 79 
Verbal self-concept .0649 3.61 .0051 .0571 69  .0227 4.53 .0043 .033 69 
Mathematical self-
concept 
.0416 3.31 .0063 .0690 77  .0000 .0015 .0001 .9689 77 
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significance suggests that there are notable mean gender differences on these measures. 
Additionally, despite verbal ability being a stereotypically female-oriented intelligence and 
women typically scoring higher on objective measures, results were still significant 
favoring men (though the effect size was negligible). Finally, the mixed results from both 
hypothesized and exploratory moderators suggests avenues of future research. 
4.5 Implications 
 Overall, the lack of available data to evaluate the impact of sex-type on academic 
self-concept or to compare self-concept to objective measures makes it difficult to assess 
any true implications. Findings suggest that men have higher self-concepts for overall 
academic, verbal, and mathematical domains than women, but this study was unable to 
adequately address the underlying influences on the magnitude of those differences. In this 
regard, the results are disappointing. It is commonly posited that gender differences in self-
concept are due to female humility and male hubris (Furnham, 2001), but without the 
appropriate data being available, this study was unable to test this hypothesis. To 
thoroughly investigate the relationships between sex-role adherence, academic self-
concept, and objective intelligence, further research is required.   
4.6 Limitations 
  The first and largest limitation of this study was the limited availability of relevant 
data. Though I was able to identify a plethora of pertinent studies, a large portion of the 
articles did not report the necessary statistics for computing effect sizes and authors did not 
respond to requests for additional data. Additionally, one of my primary moderators of 
interest, Bem’s Sex Role Orientation, was unable to be explored due to the extremely small 
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number of articles investigating the relationship between sex-role adherence and academic 
self-concept.   
As with all meta-analyses, a possible limitation is the ‘file-drawer’ problem 
(Rosenthal, 1979). There is a bias towards publishing statistically significant results 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), and research shows that published articles have a larger mean 
effect size than unpublished articles (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993). However, because published 
articles are more accessible, meta-analyses often overrepresent significant findings, 
causing an upward bias in the results. Though authors were contacted to obtain unpublished 
works, I received no additional studies and was not able to lessen the file-drawer problem 
through the inclusion of unpublished data.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This study represents an attempt to examine gender differences in multiple domains 
of self-concept using meta-analytic methods. Though significant weighted mean effect size 
differences were found for overall academic, verbal, and mathematical self-concepts, most 
hypotheses regarding the influence of moderating variables were not supported. Findings 
of significant gender differences in self-concept in all three domains are an interesting 
contrast to recent findings of limited gender differences in objective intelligence. 
Additionally, there was a notable lack of articles containing data for Bem’s Sex Role 
Inventory, as well as a lack of articles reporting both self-concept and objective intelligence 
measures. These limitations left me unable to adequately address the underlying questions 
of why gender differences exist in self-concept and whether the gender differences in self-
concept reflect actual differences on objective measures. Future research should investigate 
the directionality of any discrepancies between self-concept and objective measures to 
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